Hi Robert. Hope all is well in your world. I have not understood something and I wonder if you would help clarify. I watched Dennett's video “what is free will?” that you posted in DONT. As I’ve read your views on these matters and read Sapolsky, I still don’t really understand what Dennett is getting at. I understand that the whole “choice” /free will” is biologically determined. So how is Dennett stating that free will still exists and to what degree? (I tried reading Consciousness Explained but failed) . I know you’ve answered questions on the post and like De Galleymon, I had maybe also misunderstood your view, which I considered was more in accord with Sapolsky, who asserts he thinks free will is completely non-existent on a biological/neurological basis, denying the homunculus. How can both views be compatible?
Many thanks for helping the ones at the back of the class struggling to keep up!
Trevor
Hi, Trevor. :)
This is a complex matter that has engaged human attention since at least the ancient Greek stoics, and probably earlier. If you want to learn more about it, try reading about what "dualists" believe and how "compatibilists" view this question.
Briefly, one might argue that everything that occurs is inevitable because every atom in one's body is acted upon by every other particle in the Universe in one way or another. In that view, if one could know the state of the Universe completely and totally at this moment, one could predict everything that would occur in the next moment. This is "determinism," which rules out all-encompassing free will entirely, since the motives that cause one to act or not act are determined by, and not in any way separate from what went before.
The most common alternative to that view is dualism, which posits a "soul" or "mind" that is not subject to the ordinary constraints of naturalism. This idea is basic to most religions in one way or another. I don't accept it, nor does Sapolsky, nor Dennett.
So what is Dennett saying? As I understand him, everything in the Universe is determined, including one's every thought and action, but we have no access to that level. To know what will happen in the future--even in the next second--we would have to know not just the position and momentum of every grain of sand on every beach on Earth, but the momentum of every subatomic particle in each grain of sand, and that's just one little planet in one minor galaxy, a surpassingly tiny part of the Universe. So, the future is everything we don't know and cannot know. But that does not mean that the future is unreal or uncertain. If one goes with naturalism/determinism, the future is what will happen, which is already determined, but not knowable.
Since we cannot know what will happen, Dennett seems to be saying, we must use whatever powers we have to predict what might happen and if we are competent predictors, our choices and actions will be more satisfactory than someone who says, "This is all predestined anyway, so why even try?"
Yes, it can be argued that whether one tries or not is already predetermined, but we don't know that. In Dennett's view, as I understand it, we cannot live on the level of logical determinism, although he assumes determinism is more valid than dualism. As biological beings, we must live on this level which is about survival and enjoyment, so, for example, if you see a truck headed right at you, you do not say, "It's already determined whether that truck will hit me or not." No! You try to avoid being hit. Is that effort at avoidance predetermined, including its success or failure? Probably yes, but that's not the level on which we live.
As Schopenhauer put it, "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." So that is the limit of "free will:" to do as you will. My freedom is to be aware of what I want to occur and what I prefer to avoid and then to use the capacities at my disposal accordingly.
To take an example, As an old man, I would like to avoid senility, so I "choose" to eat right and go slow on the alcohol, even if that means foregoing the next glass of wine. Yes, you can say that whether I drink that next glass of wine is already determined, but if it is, my wanting to avoid senility is part of that. So, let's say that "free will" means taking responsibility as best I can.
For me, and I think for Dennett, this means chopping wood and carrying water.
More On Free Will
This is a lovely explanation Robert, I’ve been curious as to how you felt about Dennett and compatiblism and this does not disappoint.
If it’s okay, I thought I’d quickly venture my own understanding of Dennett on Free Will as I also found him to be a bit tricky in the past.
I think that Dennett’s first book on Free Will, Elbow Room, communicates his ideas much better than his later book, Freedom Evolves. Though FE contains one of my favourite maxims from Dennett on the issue, “If you make yourself really small, you can externalise almost everything.” I think one of Dennett’s strengths is also his biggest weakness. He’s so good at explaining the hypotheses that he intends to refute that he sometimes undermines his own refutations!
In general Dennett is trying to stop people falling into a kind of naive cosmic fatalism on the issue of Free Will, the idea that you are doing something because of the Big Bang and could not have done otherwise. This is why he coined three stances that he posits are the best viewpoints to take on certain happenings - The Physical Stance, The Design Stance and the Intentional Stance.
The Physical Stance is useful for when we look at something happening simply because it is following the laws of physics (The water molecules reaching boiling point in my kettle). The Design Stance is useful when we look at things that perform a certain action because they have been designed to do it (the kettle itself). Finally the Intentional Stance covers when the action is the result of an organism acting on their own intentions, urges and/or preferences in order to perform that action (me making a cup of tea).
If someone asks why is the water boiling the best answer is probably “Because I’m making a cup of tea” (Intentional stance) rather than “Because it’s in a kettle” (Design Stance) or “Because the water is following the laws of thermodynamics” (Physical Stance). [cont]
Thank ypu Robert for this explanation. I feel like another piece of the "free will" puzzle just fell in..