This is a lovely explanation Robert, I’ve been curious as to how you felt about Dennett and compatiblism and this does not disappoint.
If it’s okay, I thought I’d quickly venture my own understanding of Dennett on Free Will as I also found him to be a bit tricky in the past.
I think that Dennett’s first book on Free Will, Elbow Room, communicates his ideas much better than his later book, Freedom Evolves. Though FE contains one of my favourite maxims from Dennett on the issue, “If you make yourself really small, you can externalise almost everything.” I think one of Dennett’s strengths is also his biggest weakness. He’s so good at explaining the hypotheses that he intends to refute that he sometimes undermines his own refutations!
In general Dennett is trying to stop people falling into a kind of naive cosmic fatalism on the issue of Free Will, the idea that you are doing something because of the Big Bang and could not have done otherwise. This is why he coined three stances that he posits are the best viewpoints to take on certain happenings - The Physical Stance, The Design Stance and the Intentional Stance.
The Physical Stance is useful for when we look at something happening simply because it is following the laws of physics (The water molecules reaching boiling point in my kettle). The Design Stance is useful when we look at things that perform a certain action because they have been designed to do it (the kettle itself). Finally the Intentional Stance covers when the action is the result of an organism acting on their own intentions, urges and/or preferences in order to perform that action (me making a cup of tea).
If someone asks why is the water boiling the best answer is probably “Because I’m making a cup of tea” (Intentional stance) rather than “Because it’s in a kettle” (Design Stance) or “Because the water is following the laws of thermodynamics” (Physical Stance). [cont]
While Dennett does not believe in a causeless causer or a little person in the head making decisions, he doesn’t subscribe to the fatalist idea that we are marionettes bobbing about within the tides of physical processes either. This (as far as I understand him) is due to the category error of taking the Physical Stance over instances that are better served by the Intentional Stance.
The compatiblism that Dennett or Anil Seth subscribe to is simply a way of saying “the kettle is boiling because you chose to make a cup of tea” in a way that doesn’t invoke magical agents that are isolated from causation while simultaneously being the cause of their own actions. Anil Seth calls this “Spooky Free Will” in order to differentiate it from compatiblism.
Anyway, I thought I’d post this as I wrestled with Dennett for many years and still find plenty or disagreement with some of his ideas. I find myself in agreement with him over Free Will while still scratching my head when he talks about qualia. As with all philosophers, it’s more fruitful to engage with *how* they think rather than *what* they think and I’m still a big fan of how Dennett thinks.
I have never understood why the subject of free will (or not) is important in our lives. Why does it matter? What problem would an answer solve? Is there a realm of deeper understanding and feeling that opens to us past this gate... or, as I suspect, it becomes clear that the space and freedom for such exploration is naturally right here, and opens to us as the clutter of old notions are picked up and put away?
This is a lovely explanation Robert, I’ve been curious as to how you felt about Dennett and compatiblism and this does not disappoint.
If it’s okay, I thought I’d quickly venture my own understanding of Dennett on Free Will as I also found him to be a bit tricky in the past.
I think that Dennett’s first book on Free Will, Elbow Room, communicates his ideas much better than his later book, Freedom Evolves. Though FE contains one of my favourite maxims from Dennett on the issue, “If you make yourself really small, you can externalise almost everything.” I think one of Dennett’s strengths is also his biggest weakness. He’s so good at explaining the hypotheses that he intends to refute that he sometimes undermines his own refutations!
In general Dennett is trying to stop people falling into a kind of naive cosmic fatalism on the issue of Free Will, the idea that you are doing something because of the Big Bang and could not have done otherwise. This is why he coined three stances that he posits are the best viewpoints to take on certain happenings - The Physical Stance, The Design Stance and the Intentional Stance.
The Physical Stance is useful for when we look at something happening simply because it is following the laws of physics (The water molecules reaching boiling point in my kettle). The Design Stance is useful when we look at things that perform a certain action because they have been designed to do it (the kettle itself). Finally the Intentional Stance covers when the action is the result of an organism acting on their own intentions, urges and/or preferences in order to perform that action (me making a cup of tea).
If someone asks why is the water boiling the best answer is probably “Because I’m making a cup of tea” (Intentional stance) rather than “Because it’s in a kettle” (Design Stance) or “Because the water is following the laws of thermodynamics” (Physical Stance). [cont]
[cont]
While Dennett does not believe in a causeless causer or a little person in the head making decisions, he doesn’t subscribe to the fatalist idea that we are marionettes bobbing about within the tides of physical processes either. This (as far as I understand him) is due to the category error of taking the Physical Stance over instances that are better served by the Intentional Stance.
The compatiblism that Dennett or Anil Seth subscribe to is simply a way of saying “the kettle is boiling because you chose to make a cup of tea” in a way that doesn’t invoke magical agents that are isolated from causation while simultaneously being the cause of their own actions. Anil Seth calls this “Spooky Free Will” in order to differentiate it from compatiblism.
Anyway, I thought I’d post this as I wrestled with Dennett for many years and still find plenty or disagreement with some of his ideas. I find myself in agreement with him over Free Will while still scratching my head when he talks about qualia. As with all philosophers, it’s more fruitful to engage with *how* they think rather than *what* they think and I’m still a big fan of how Dennett thinks.
Thank you, Niall. A worthy contribution to the conversation.
Thank ypu Robert for this explanation. I feel like another piece of the "free will" puzzle just fell in..
I have never understood why the subject of free will (or not) is important in our lives. Why does it matter? What problem would an answer solve? Is there a realm of deeper understanding and feeling that opens to us past this gate... or, as I suspect, it becomes clear that the space and freedom for such exploration is naturally right here, and opens to us as the clutter of old notions are picked up and put away?